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Aging and public pensions in an overlapping-generations model
Lex Meijdam Harrie A.A. Verbon 
April 11, 1995
Abstract
In this paper decision making on public pensions is modeled within the framework of
the well-known two-overlapping-generations general-equilibriummodel with rational expec-
tations. The model is used to analyze the eects of aging on the evolution of public pension
schemes. Analytical results are derived for the long run as well as for the short run by the
method of comparative statics and comparative dynamics respectively. This shows that the
short-run consequences of aging depend crucially on the existing size of the PAYG-scheme.
JEL Code: H55
1 Introduction
In most developed countries, a substantial part of the elderly's income is provided for by means
of public pension schemes. Generally, these public pension plans are nanced by a Pay-As-
You-Go (or PAYG) scheme where current pension payments are nanced out of current tax
payments that are collectively decided upon. These PAYG-schemes have drawn a great deal
of attention recently due to the expected aging of the population and the increasing tax rates
this might entail. It is of interest to consider what should be the reactions of policy makers
to the demographic changes that are taking place. This issue is considered in the framework
of an overlapping-generations (OLG) general-equilibrium model of economic growth where a
central planner with an innite horizon maximizes a Benthamite social welfare function. That
is, the central planner maximizes a discounted innite sum of weighted average utilities of
successive generations of nitely lived consumers where the weights are determined by the
size of the generations. Our paper shares the objectives of papers such as by Peters (1991)
and Bovenberg et al. (1993). In deriving short-run eects of aging it is assumed by Peters
(1991) that the central planner does not take the whole future into account. This is not
the case in Bovenberg et al. (1993). They use an Auerbach-Kotliko (1987) intertemporal
framework in deriving general-equilibrium responses to aging. Unlike our paper they are not
able to give analytical solutions for transition paths and have to rely on numerical simulations.
The eects of aging in an OLG-model can also be contrasted with the eects in the Ramsey-
model of economic growth. A path-breaking and often cited paper in this area is Cutler et
al. (1990). The main assumptions of the Ramsey-model are that innitely-long living agents
have perfect foresight and that the economy follows a path that maximizes discounted utility
over an innite horizon. The drawback of this structure is that intergenerational redistribution
eects of aging cannot be taken into account. The point is that redistribution only ts in the
Ramsey-framework if the planning problem facing the government can be decomposed into
two subproblems, a standard problem of aggregate capital accumulation and a problem of
Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University, PO-Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Nether-
lands. Comments from Lans Bovenberg and Marijn Verhoeven are gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors
are, of course, ours.
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distributing consumption optimally on each date among the generations alive then. This is
not possible, however, if the size of the population size varies and the government maximizes a
Benthamite social welfare function. Therefore, in that case the Calvo-Obstfeld result that "the
Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey framework can be used to evaluate paths of aggregate consumption
even in models where dierent generations co-exist"1 does not hold.
The closed-economy general-equilibrium framework used in this paper is presented in Section
2. In Section 3 a central planner is introduced that decides on the allocation of production
to consumption and investment, and the distribution of consumption between young and old
individuals, resp.. As is well known such a command optimum can be replicated by a market
economy accompanied by a PAYG-nanced public pension scheme.
In Section 4 we investigate how a PAYG-pension system reacts to the aging of the population
which can be expected to occur in the next century in most countries of the Western world.
Aging can have several eects. First, everything else given, aging implies higher contribution
rates. This eect has drawn the most attention and concern expressed e.g. in policy circles2.
The policy reaction then may be to decrease the benets. Secondly, aging implies that less
saving is necessary to maintain a certain capital-labor ratio. In this paper both these eects of
aging are taken into account and it will be derived under what circumstances aging will lead to
an increasing or a decreasing relative importance of the PAYG-scheme. It should be stressed
that the short-run eects can dier considerably from the eects in the long run. Therefore, we
not only perform a comparative statics analysis in order to trace the long-run eects, but we
also study the short-run consequences of aging. We derive analytical results for the short run for
fairly general specications for utility and production functions by the method of comparative
dynamics. Morover, we distinguish between expected and unexpected shocks. By using an
OLG-model we are able to qualify one of the central results of Cutler et al., namely that an
expected aging of the population will lead to short-run gains in consumption possibilities. It
will be shown that this result depends on the size of the PAYG-scheme. The same holds true
for unexpected changes in the rate of population growth. As a corollary it is shown that an
expected decrease in the rate of population growth may lead to the introduction of a public
pension system in an economy where such a scheme previously did not exist.
The paper winds up with some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 The Model
2.1 The Individuals
The analysis is based on the well-known two-overlapping-generations model where there is a
large number of individuals living for two periods and every one is identical except for dierences
in age. Since the young's savings decisions are assumed to be decentralized and uncoordinated,
each young individual takes aggregate savings and the tax rate as given. It is assumed that
every individual born at time t works a xed amount of time at wage wt during the rst period
of his life. A part of this wage is taxed away by the government by a lump-sum tax t to be
transferred to the old. The remainder is used for savings for old age (st) and for consumption
(c
y
t ). So we get:
c
y
t = wt   t   st: (1)
1Calvo and Obstfeld (1988, p.163).
2See, e.g. Van den Noord and Herd (1993).
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When old, the individual consumes the return on his savings and the transfer payment  from
the government. So the consumption at time t + 1 of an old individual born at time t (crt ) is
equal to:
crt = (1 + rt+1)st + t+1: (2)
Individuals are assumed not to be altruistic: they do not care about the levels of utility of
individuals born in another time period. It is assumed that lifetime utility of an individual







where the felicity functions obey the Inada-conditions. The parameter  indicates the rate of







where u0(c)  du
dc
. This condition states that the young use savings to equate the marginal
rate of substitution of consumption in the rst and the second part of their lives to the rate of
return on savings3.
2.2 The Markets
We close the model by conventional equilibrium conditions on the factor markets and the goods
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< 0) where kt is the capital-labor ratio. Abstracting
from depreciation and assuming that rms act competitively and that labor supply is exogenous
factor market equilibrium is described by the marginal productivity conditions:
f(kt)  ktf
0(kt) = wt; (5)
f 0(kt) = rt: (6)
Equilibrium on the goods market implies for our closed-economy model that investment be
equal to savings or in per worker terms:
(1 + n)kt+1 = st; (7)
where n is the rate of population growth which is assumed to be determined exogenously4.
Eqs. (1), (2), (5), (6) and (7) imply the following resource constraint for the economy as a
whole:






which simply says that total supply of goods can be allocated to investment or to consumption
by the currently living generations.
3Notice that an internal solution has been assumed. Excluding perverse solutions, the existence of such a
solution will be guaranteed due to the requirement of equilibrium on the goods market to be discussed below.
4For exposational reasons, we initially assume n to be constant.
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3 Decision making on public pensions
The government at time t is assumed to maximize a Benthamite social welfare function with a









; (0 <  <1): (9)
According to eq. (9) the government is a social planner who takes account of the welfare of all
current and future generations where the welfare of a generation is measured by the utility of
a representative individual of this generation weighted by the size of the generation5.
Assuming that n <  the rst-order conditions for a command optimum that maximizes















Eq. (11) is a condition for optimal allocation between young and old alive at the same time
and eq. (12) optimizes intertemporal allocation. Notice that combining these conditions with
eq. (6) leads to the rst-order condition for saving (eq. (4)). So the central planner respects
the individual's saving decision. This implies that the command optimum can be realized in a
market economy with intergenerational redistribution through a PAYG-scheme7. Abstracting
from administrative costs the budget restriction of this scheme reads:
t = (1 + n)t: (12)
It follows directly from eqs. (11) and (12) that the steady state of the model is characterized
by8:
r = : (13)
This is the well-known modied golden rule: the higher the social discount factor, the lower
the capital stock per worker in the steady state will be, which is, of course accomplished by
a higher transfer which has a negative eect on savings. Notice that the assumption  > n
implies that the economy is dynamically ecient in the steady state (r > n). In the case where
  n the rst-order conditions (11) and (12) do not apply. It is evident that in that case the
optimal policy implies a steady state that satises the golden rule (r = n), however9.
5The choice for this form of the welfare function is motivated by the fact that without this weighting the
planner would raise the consumption of members of small cohorts relative to that of members of larger cohorts.
For a discussion on the advantages of a Benthamite social welfare function see Blanchet and Kessler (1991).
6See Blanchard and Fischer (1989), section 3.1.
7It should further be noted that the optimal policy is (stationary and non-stationary) time consistent. See
Bernheim (1989).
8When no time subscript is used the steady-state value is meant.
9As the golden rule implies that total consumption possibilities are maximized, any time path that does not
lead to the golden rule is dominated according to the take-over criterion by a time path that leads to r = n.
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4 The eects of aging
In this section we consider the eects of aging reected by a decrease in population growth
(n). The short-run as well as the long-run consequences of once-and-for-all changes in n are
derived analytically.10. The long-run eects follow from comparing steady states, while the
short-run consequences are traced by comparative dynamics11. Regarding the short run, the
eects of unexpected and expected shocks can be distinguished. The analysis learns that
the short-run eects of aging can be (but need not be) opposite to the eects in the long
run. E.g., while a current or future decrease in population growth leads to losses in utility in
the long run in a dynamically ecient economy, short-run gains in utility for young and old
individuals are possible. The reason for this result is well known, i.e. aging decreases the future
need of capital which can incite the social planner to decrease savings and thus increase current
consumption. However, this consumption-stimulating eect can be undone if the PAYG-system
entails relatively high transfers. It should be noted at the outset that this last eect is absent
in Ramsey models.
The comparative statics as well as the comparative dynamics analysis is based on lin-
earization of the model presented above around the steady state. We concentrate on the
eects of once-and-for-all decreases in population growth (n). Let nt = n + ht where
ht describes the time pattern of the perturbation of the steady-state value of the param-
eter n and  the magnitude. It is assumed that at some time t = 0 a shock unexpect-
edly occurs (i.e. h0 = h1 =    = h < 0) or is expected to occur at time z > 0 (i.e.
h0 = h1 =   hz 1 = 0; hz = hz+1 =    = h < 0). It will be convenient in the sequel







The linearized model can then be condensed to a system describing the changes in this variable



















; t = 0; 1; :::: (15)
where M is a matrix describing the eects of the current and next-period change in n on the
state variables and J is the Jacobian matrix (see the Appendix for details). As the system in
eq. (15) is saddlepoint stable it can be solved to nd the initial eect of changes in n on total
consumption i.e. @c0
@
(see Blanchard and Kahn (1981)). The evolution of c and k can then be
traced by using the same system again. The changes in all other variables can be derived from
the changes of these state variables. In particular, we calculate the changes in consumption of
the young and the old and the eect on the tax rate, respectively.
10Most results can directly be generalized to temporary changes in these parameters.
11This method is described by Judd (1982) for a continuous-time model. It can easily be generalized to
discrete time, however. See Meijdam and Verhoeven (1994), who also show that the approximation of the short-
run eects of a parameter change by this method is as reliable as a standard comparative-statics analysis. The
method is explained in the Appendix.
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The short-run eects of an unexpected decrease in n
An unexpected decrease in population growth leads to macroeconomic eects on total con-
sumption that can be derived by solving the system in eq. (15). The eect of the change in
n on total consumption per worker can be read o from eq. (v) in the Appendix, which is
rewritten here for convenience12
@c0
@






















Notice from eq. (16) that the optimal response of total consumption is in part determined by
future changes in the rate of population growth. This is a reection of the forward-looking
behavior of the central planner who takes account of the utility of all future generations. The
initial macroeconomic eect on consumption appears to consist of several elements. Firstly,
a decrease in n causes an upward jump in the capital-labor ratio, which implies a higher





h0 > 0). On top of this, the eect on initial consumption is in part
determined by anticipation of the future eects of the change in n as reected by the appearance
of the terms hj( j > 0) in eq. (16). Two future eects can be discerned. The rst is the capital
thickening eect (k, see the second term in eq. (16)) 13 . This eect stems from the fact that a
decrease in n implies that a certain level of saving per worker ceteris paribus leads to a higher
capital-labor ratio next period. This is anticipated by immediately decreasing the saving rate,
so that consumption increases. The second future eect comes from redistribution between the
young and the old. This is caused by the change in the so-called dependency ratio dened as
the number of pensioners per worker. This dependency-ratio eect ( c
r
(1+n)2
) implies that total
consumption per worker has to be shared with a larger number of pensioners. Although this is
a redistribution eect it may inuence savings and thus total consumption. Of course, in case
of an unexpected decrease in n, the dependency-ratio eect not only aects future consumption
but initial consumption as well. However, if the change in population growth is once-and-for-
all, so that hj = h 8j  0, then the initial dependency-ratio eect is exactly compensated by
the future eect. This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1
In the case of an unexpected once-and-for-all change in population growth, the change in the
dependency ratio does not aect initial total consumption.
This lemma can be viewed as an extension of the result in Cutler et al. (1990) that in a
Ramsey model the dependency ratio does not inuence steady-state savings.
It immediately follows that the initial macroeconomic eect on total consumption in the case
of a once-and-for-all is shock positive. However, even though total consumption rises initially,
old-age consumption as well as young-age consumption may fall in the short run if the negative
dependency-ratio eect is strong enough. This appears from the change in consumption of the
young and the old resulting from both macroeconomic eects and redistribution eects which
follow from dierentiating eq. (11) and using eq. (14):
12
 and 2 are dened in the Appendix. There it is also shown that  > 0 and 2   1   > 0.
13This exactly the opposite of the capital dilution eect that occurs in case of an increase in n. See e.g.






















The parameter  indicates the share of the young in the change of total consumption. This
share is dened as  = 
y
y+(1+n)r
, where y is the absolute rate of risk aversion of a young
individual which is dened as y =
 u00(cy)
u0(cy)
. Analogously, r stands for the risk aversion of
an old individual. The equations show that the larger the absolute rate of risk aversion of
a generation relative to the risk aversion of the other generation, the smaller its part in the
change of total consumption14. Moreover, it indicates that the positive macroeconomic eect
on individual consumption can be dominated by the dependency ratio eect dependent upon
the level of consumption by the old in the steady state.
The fact that individual consumption may fall or rise in the short run seems in line with
the results of Cutler et al. (1990) who conclude that decreases in the rate of population growth
have theoretically ambiguous short-run eects on individual consumption. Their numerical
experiments show that for some countries short-run gains but for others short-run decreases in
individual consumption result in the case of aging. In particular, if the aging of the population
is beginning to be felt immediately (as in the case of Japan) then the current generations will
be worse o while if aging is less severe in the next two decades (as e.g. in the U.S.) short-run
consumption gains can be obtained. However, our analysis qualies these results as it turns
out that whether consumption rises or falls heavily depends on the size of the PAYG-scheme.
In particular, using eq. (16) the following proposition can easily be derived:
Proposition 1
An unexpected once-and-for-all decrease in n initially decreases individual consumption i
 > (1  1)s
15.
The interpretation of this proposition is straightforward: in the case of a large PAYG-system
the increase in the consumption possibilities due to the decrease in savings of the young is not
sucient to provide the relatively larger number of old with the same, relatively high level of
consumption as before the shock.
The eect of a change in n on the tax rate in period t is given by:
@t
@










14Notice that this implies that if the felicity function is of the CRRA type, i.e. the relative rate of risk aversion
is constant, the generation with the largest level of individual consumption gets the largest part of the change
in total consumption.
15
1 < 1 is the stable root of the linearized system.
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The rst term in this equation indicates the eect of a change in the capital-labor ratio. At
a given interest rate an increase in the capital stock per worker implies an increase of the
consumption by pensioners of (1+r)@kt
@
thus decreasing the need for redistribution from young
to the old through  . An increase in the capital-labor ratio also decreases the interest rate, thus
increasing the need for redistribution. This eect is measured by  , which is the (positively
dened) elasticity of the production function  =
 f 00(k)k
f 0(k)
. The larger this elasticity, the larger
the eect of a change in the capital-labor ratio on the interest rate. The second term in equation
(19) represents the eect of a change in total consumption on the tax rate. As a part  of total
consumption goes to the old, more total consumption ceteris paribus increases the tax rate. In
the third term we recognize the dependency-ratio eect again. An increase in the dependency
ratio ceteris paribus increases the tax rate. The total eect on the tax rate that results in the
case of an unexpected change in the rate of population growth is ambiguous.
The short-run eects of an expected decrease in n
Notice rst that in the case of an expected once-and-for-all change at time t = z (i.e. h0 =
::::: = hz 1 = 0, hz = hz+1 = ::::: < 0) there is no dependency-ratio eect at time t = 0. As a









are proportional to the change in



















So the initial macroeconomic eect is determined by the anticipated dependency ratio eects
and capital thickening eects16. The dierence between the dependency-ratio eect and the
capital-thickening eect depends on s and c
r
1+n
again. The following proposition can easily be
derived from eq. (20):
Proposition 2
An anticipated once-and-for-all decrease in n initially decreases individual consumption i
  (1  1 + )s.
Comparing with Proposition 1 it is of interest to observe that no qualitative dierence exists
regarding the short-run eects. However, the dierence in eects is of a quantitative nature
as can be seen from the appearance of the parameter  in Proposition 217. This (positive)
parameter can be interpreted as a measure for the speed at which changes in consumption
and investment are transmitted to future periods and vice versa. In particular, if  has a low
value anticipated future shocks will strongly aect current values and expected and unexpected
shocks will have similar results. In general, however, compared to Proposition 1, with a given
level of savings, higher taxes are needed to cause individual consumption to fall in response to
an expected decrease in n.
16The capital thickening eect is reinforced by the unstable eigenvalue, however. This is due to the additional
decrease in savings that is necessary in order to decrease the capital-labor ratio in anticipation of a future
decrease in population growth
17The parameter  is dened in the Appendix.
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It is interesting to note that Proposition 2 qualies the results from Cutler et al. once more:
it implies that, contrary to an unexpected decrease, an expected future decrease in population
growth may cause total consumption to fall initially. This is due to the overlapping-generations
structure of our model. If individual consumption decreases due to the shock the generation
born in the period before the shock rationally anticipates a decrease in public pension benets
due to the dependency-ratio eect when old (i.e. in the period of the shock) and reacts to
this by increasing savings when young. This will in turn lead to a decrease in transfers in the
period before the shock and so on. Eventually this will lead to an increase in savings and thus
a decrease in total consumption at t = 0. Whether this negative eect on consumption is large
enough to outweigh the positive eect due to the anticipated capital thickening eect depends
on the size of the PAYG-scheme again. So, in countries where the aging of the population will
not occur before the next century but where the PAYG-system is relatively extensive it might
be necessary nevertheless to cut in intergenerational transfers.
Using the fact that the capital-labor ratio and the dependency ratio do not change initially,
the following corollary can be derived from eq. (19) and Proposition 2:
Corollary 1
An anticipated once-and-for-all decrease in n initially increases the tax rate i
  (1  1 + )s.
This corollary has an interesting implication. It implies that in the absence of a PAYG-nanced
public pension system such a system can come about in anticipation of a decrease in the rate
of population growth. This result is rather surprising as intuition says that an increasing
population would give more room for the installation of a public pension system due to the low
tax rates implied by high rates of population growth. The point is that an auent capital stock
at the time of the shock is anticipated by the forward-looking government which incites her to
increase the tax rate simultaneously leading to a decrease of the savings by all generations living
before the shock. These desinvestments lead to an increase in the consumption possibilities for
old and young individuals.
The long-run eects of a decrease in n
In the long run, the capital stock per worker remains unchanged as immediately can be seen
from the modied golden rule (eq.(13)). Moreover, the redistribution eects of a change in the
dependency ratio cancel out and do not aect total consumption. So the only eect on total
consumption per worker in the long run is the positive capital thickening eect. Consequently,









h > 0: (21)
As in Cutler et al. the long-run eect of aging on individual consumption is the sum of a positive
capital thickening eect and a negative dependency-ratio eect. In contrast to this paper, we
can easily determine the net eect as in our model18 there is an explicit relation between these
two eects. It immediately follows that the capital-thickening eect on individual consumption
outweighs the dependency-ratio eect i the part of total consumption per worker consumed
by pensioners ( c
r
1+n
) is smaller than savings per worker. From eqs. (2), (7) and (9) it follows
that this condition is equivalent to  < (n  r)k. This leads us to the following proposition:
18Notice that life expectancy at the time of birth is xed.
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Proposition 3
In a dynamically ecient economy (r > n) with a non-negative tax rate, a decrease in n
decreases individual consumption in the long run.
As in the long run the capital-labor ratio does not change, it can easily be derived that
the long-run tax rate is a negative function of the rate of population growth. Consequently,
the eect of a decrease in population growth on the long-run transfer payment  is positive if
  0. If the tax rate is positive, however, the eect on the transfer payment is ambiguous.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper the eects of aging on PAYG-nanced public pension schemes and individual
consumption has been analyzed in an overlapping-generations general-equilibrium framework.
The long-run eects of aging are well-known. This knowledge is summarized in Proposition 3 of
this paper. The short-run eects, however, are much less known in the literature. In particular,
Cutler et al. (1990) claim these eects to be ambiguous, but, at the same time, suggest by
numerical simulations that an unexpected decrease in the rate of population growth will have
a negative eect on individual consumption, while if this decrease is expected to occur after a
few decades, short-run gains in consumption will be obtained.
This paper has derived the short-run eects of aging analytically. The results are reected
in Propositions 1 and 2. These propositions claim that for unexpected as well for expected
aging of the population the size of the PAYG-nanced public pension scheme is the determining
variable for the short-run eects. In particular, for an extensive public pension system both
types of shocks may lead to losses in individual consumption. On the other hand, if the PAYG-
taxes are relatively small, gains in consumption will be enabled by a decrease in savings. In an
OLG-model these gains in consumption possibilities are partly transferred to the old through
an increase in the tax rate. So, it follows that if a PAYG-scheme is non existent, it can come
about because of an expected decrease in the rate of population growth. With an eye turned
to reality this implies that the abundant growth in coverage and size of public pension schemes
which has been manifest in the Western world the rst two decades after World War II could
be explained from the anticipation of the aging of the population to occur in the rst decades
of the next century when the baby-boom generation retires. So the growth of public pension
schemes in the face of aging could have been a welfare-maximizing policy according to our
model. Recent measures taken in the Western world aimed at restricting the growth rate of
the taxes could then be explained from the fact that demographic changes appear to be much
more dramatic than expected. In particular, given the then existing extensive PAYG-scheme,
the sharp decrease in birth rates that started in the seventies in the EC-countries made a drop
in benet rates unavoidable.
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The method of comparative dynamics works as follows. Let ht describe the time pattern of the
perturbation of the steady-state value of the parameter n and  the magnitude. So nt = n+ht.
The eects of a marginal change in n can then be traced by dierentiation of the rst-order eqs.
(4) and (12) and the resource constraint (8) with respect to . This yields the following linear






















; t = 0; 1; :::: (i)
where M is a matrix describing the eects of the current and next-period change in the exoge-





















where  =  f
00(k)k
f 0(k)
is the (positively dened) elasticity of the production function,  =
r
yk(1+r)(1+n)(1 )
> 0 and  = 
y
y+(1+n)r
. The parameter y stands for the absolute rate
of risk aversion of a young individual which is dened as  u
00(cy)
u0(cy)
. Analogously, r indicates
the risk aversion of an old individual.
This system comprizes one predetermined variable (k) and one forward-looking variable (c).

























+ )2 + 4]
As easily can be checked, one of these eigenvalues lies inside while the other lies outside the
unit circle. So the system is saddlepoint stable and can be solved to nd the initial eect of

































where jij and mij(i; j = 1; 2) denote elements of J and M . The evolution of both k and c can
then be derived from the system equations. Given the evolution of total consumption we can
calculate the time paths of consumption by the young or the old using the denition of c. The
eect on the pension system then follows.
























The rst term on the right hand side of this equation describes the initial eect on total
consumption of an expected change in population growth while the second term indicates the
additional eect in case of an unexpected decrease in n (h0 < 0). The latter eect is, of course,
positive20. The eect of an unexpected once-and-for-all decrease in n is the sum of both terms
with h0 = h1 =    = h < 0.
19
We have used the fact that (1 + n)(2   1) =
1 j11
j12














> 0 it immediately follows
from footnote (19) that  + 1  2 < 0
